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NOTES AND COMMENT

Motor Vehicles-Nolo Contendere-Suspension of Driver's License
Based Solely on the Record of Sentence on Such Plea Held Invalid
The question whether the record of a plea of nolo contenderel entered
in a drunken driving case will support a suspension of the operator's
license by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles pursuant to provisions
of G. S. 20-162 was recently presented to the Supreme Court for the
first time. In holding the Commissioner's action, taken solely upon the
record of the licensee's plea of nolo contendere, to be without authority
of law, the Court said that, the suspension proceedings before the Commissioner being separate from the proceedings in which the plea was
entered, the record was neither sufficient evidence of the offense 3nor the
equivalent of an admission that an offense had been committed.
The plea of nolo contendere is of ancient origin 4 and has been recognized by our Supreme Court since 1837. 5 It authorizes judgment as
upon a verdict or plea of guilty,6 but leaves the defendant free to assert
8
his innocence in all other proceedings, both civil 7 and criminal, the

judgment and sentence upon the plea not being the equivalent of conviction or confession in open court. 9 Other jurisdictions, confronted
with analogous situations, have relaxed this strict rule' ° and have drawn
two distinctions not expressly considered by the North Carolina Court:
(1) The issue involved in a proceeding of this nature is not the guilt or
innocence of the licensee but rather whether or not he has been con'Lat. I do not wish to contest (the action). 2 Bouvia's LAw DIcnoNARa
2354 (1914). For an excellent survey of the topic, see 30 N. C. L. REv. 407 (1952).
2 The statute gives the Commissioner "authority to suspend the license of any
operator . . . upon a showing by its records or other satisfactory evidence that the
licensee . . . has committed an offense for which mandatory revocation of license
is required upon conviction." N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16 (1953). Driving under
the influence of intoxicating liquor is such an offense.
2Winesett v. Scheidt, 239 N. C. 190, 79 S. E. 2d,501 (1954).
1 LAmUAXD, EIRFNARCHA: oR op The Office of the Justices of the Peace 511
(4th rev. 1599). This manual cites entries, relative to the plea, entered in 1407
and 1409.
'The earliest reported case appears to be State v. Oxendine, 19 N. C. 435
(1837).
State v. Cooper, 238 N. C. 241, 77 S. E. 2d 695 (1953) ; State v. Beasley, 226

N. C. 579, 39 S. E. 2d 607 (1946).
71n re Stiers, 204 N. C. 48, 167 S. E. 382 (1933).
8 State v. Thomas, 236 N. C. 196, 72 S. E. 2d 525 (1952).
' State v. Oxendine, 19 N. C. 435 (1837). Also Winesett v. Scheidt, 239 N. C.
190, 79 S. E. 2d 501 (1954) ; State v. Thomas, 236 N. C. 196, 72 S. E. 2d 525;
in re Stiers, 204 N. C. 48, 167 S. E. 382 (1933).
1' Louisiana State Bar Association v. Steiner, 204 La. 1073, 16 So. 2d 843
(1944) ; Louisiana State Bar Association v. Connolly, 201 La. 342, 9 So. 2d 582
(1942); Wilson v. Burke, 356 Mo. 613, 202 S. W. 2d 876 (1946) ; Neibling et al.
v. Terry, 352 Mo. 396, 177 S. W. 2d 502 (1944) ; Kravis v. Hock, 136 N. J. L. 161.
54 A. 2d 778 (1947) ; Kravis v. Hock, 135 N. J. L. 259, 51 A. 2d 441 (Sup. Ct.
1947) ; Schireson v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 129 N. J. L. 203, 28 A. 2d
879 (Sup. Ct. 1942) ; State v. Estes, 130 Tex. S. Ct. Rep. 425, 109 S. W. 2d 167
(1939).
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victed; 11 (2) where there is a statute which looks to conviction as a
basis for revoking or suspending a license without specifying how the
of nolo contendere may
conviction shall be had, sentence upon the plea
2
be considered the equivalent of a conviction.1
The decision in the principal case is based upon an earlier North
Carolina decision.' 3 In that case, defendant, an attorney at law, had
pleaded nolo contendere to an indictment for embezzlement. Under the
statute then in force, 14 disbarment proceedings predicated upon conviction for a felony were instituted. The Court held that the fact that he
bad pleaded nolo contendere could not be used against him in such proceeding because the plea does not amount to a conviction in open court.
The principal case might have been distinguished on the ground that the
statute in the Stiers case, supra, required a conviction "in open court"
while G. S. 20-16 has no such requirement. However, no cases are
found supporting such a distinction.
The concurring opinion in the principal case suggests that the Commissioner proceed to revoke the operator's license under G. S. 20-17,
which tiirects that the Commissioner "forthwith revoke the license of
any operator ... upon receiving a record of such operator's . . .conviction" for drunken driving. This result is subject to the same objection, for the Commissioner would yet be revoking the license of a person
who has not been "convicted" within the meaning ascribed to the word
by the Court. One might even look askance at the clerk of court for
having sent the record in the first place, since the applicable statute,
G. S. 20-24(a), stipulates that the clerk forward to the Department of
Motor Vehicles all driver's licenses held by the person convicted, "together with a record of such conviction." Assuming, as did the Judge
in the concurring opinion, that this revocation would not be reviewable
under G. S. 20-25,'5 still the problem is not hurdled, for the licensee
might seek a writ of mandamus to force the return7 of his license, 10 or
seek a writ of certiorari to review the action taken.1
Two other possibilities present themselves. First, the trial court
might make surrender of the license a condition, agreed to by the li11 Kravis v. Hock, 136 N. J.L. 161, 165, 54 A. 2d 778, 781 (1947). Schireson v.
State Board of Medical Examiners, 129 N. 3. L. 203, 208, 28 A. 2d 879, 881 (Sup.
Ct. 121942).
Neibling et al. v. Terry, 352 Mo. 396, 398, 177 S. W. 2d 502, 504 (1944).
13 In re Stiers, 204 N. C. 48, 167 S. E. 382 (1933).
"IN. C. CONSOL. STAT. 205 (1924) as amended by N. C. Pub. Laws 1929, c 64.
" "Any person denied a license or whose license has been cancelled, suspended,
or revoked by the Department, except where such cancellation is mandatory under
the provisions of this article, shall have a right to file a petition within thirty (30)
days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in the superior court." N. C. GaN. STAT.
(1953).
§ 20-25
' 0 Hinnekens v. Magee, 135 N. J. L. 537, 53 A. 2d 356 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
"In re Wright, 228 N. C. 584, 46 S.E. 2d 696 (1948) ; Hinnekens v. Magee,

135 N.

3. L. 537, 53 A. 2d 356 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
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censee, upon which sentence could be suspended. This course, however,
poses an objection. Suppose that the licensee were subsquently found
guilty of operating a motor vehicle without a license. This would be
sufficient to result in execution of the suspended sentence. But suppose
instead that he had entered the plea of nolo contendere to the second
offense. In that event, our Court has held that the suspended sentence
received in the first case may not be executed on the strength of the
plea entered in the second, for proof of the violation must be made independent of the plea and independent of evidence or admission that
such a plea was made.' 8 Second, it is suggested that, the plea being one
which may be entered not as a matter of right but only by leave of court,
neither the court nor the prosecuting attorney need accept the proffered
plea. While these suggestions have their advantages if strictly applied,
neither solves but only seeks to avoid the basic problem presented.
In two states, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania,' 9 the problem has
been solved by statutory enactments. The Pennsylvania statutes are particularly clear in effect. The section corresponding to G. S. 20-16 provides that:
The secretary may suspend the operating privileges of any person
...upon receiving a record of proceedings.., in which such person pleaded guilty, entered a plea of nolo contendere, or was
found guilty by judge or jury, or whenever the secretary finds
upon sufficient evidence [that certain enumerated offenses have
been committed.]20
The section that corresponds to G. S. 20-17 states:
Upon receiving a certified record, from the clerk of court, of proceedings in which a person pleaded guilty, entered a plea of nolo
contendere, or was found guilty by a judge or jury, of any of the
crimes enumerated in this section, the secretary shall forthwith
2
revoke . . . the operating privilege of any such person. '
While recognizing that the decision in the principal case is legally sound
and is inevitable in view of the Stiers precedent, it is submitted that the
great necessity for safety on our highways makes it desirable, even imperative, to revise the applicable statutes, bringing them into substantial
agreement with the Pennsylvania statutes quoted above.
MYRON C. BANKS
18

State v. Thomas, 236 N. C. 196, 72 S. E. 2d 525 (1952).

The Massachusetts statute applies only to mandatory revocation. MAss. ANN.
LAWs C. 90, § 24 (1946). The Pennsylvania Statutes, on the other hand, apply
both to mandatory and discretionary revocation. PURDON'S PENNA. STAT. ANNO.

C. 75, §§ 191, 192 (1953).

"

2"

PuRDoN's PENNA. STAT. ANNO. C. 75, § 192 (1953).
PuRnoN's PENNA. STAT. ANNO. C. 75, § 191 (1953).

